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TOO HOT TO HANDLE: SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND THE
ABDICATION OF THE JULIANA COURT
Emily Morgan*
I. INTRODUCTION
“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.”1 Chief Justice Earl Warren read the unanimous
Brown v. Board of Education decision at the Supreme Court in a room full
of reporters over the span of twenty-eight minutes.2 The Nation
instantly recognized that this opinion would touch every citizen.3
Voices on either side of the decision spoke out loudly, either praising it
or proclaiming its mistake.4 The Court, perhaps hoping that the voices
would soften, waited more than a year before issuing the specific
segregation decree.5 That infamous decree recognized that each locality
needed to cultivate its own solutions and remanded to the District
Courts to enter orders “necessary and proper” to admit the students to
schools in a nondiscriminatory manner “with all deliberate speed.”6
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund that brought Brown to the Supreme
Court successfully utilized the judicial process to implement
widespread social change.7 In the over fifty years since Chief Justice Earl
Warren read the Brown decision, it has been deemed “the most

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.B.A., University of Notre
Dame. My sincere thanks to Professor Payne for her invaluable guidance, and to the
editors of Seton Hall Law Review for their helpful feedback. I would also like to thank
my parents and brother for their unconditional love and support as I pursue my legal
career.
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 705, 711 (First Vintage Books 2004).
3 Id. at 712.
4 See id.
5 Id. at 717.
6 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
7 Case: Landmark: Brown v. Board of Education, NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND,
INC., https://www.naacpldf.org/case-issue/landmark-brown-v-board-education/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2021) [hereinafter NAACP].
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significant case on race in America’s history.”8 While plenty of work
remains to fully realize the promise of integrated, equal educational
opportunities for all,9 “[Brown’s] impact has been felt by every
American.”10
The Brown decision accelerated movement toward justice in one
societal area, but the government continues to subject citizens of the
United States to injustice in other areas. In September 2015, twentyone youth plaintiffs, Earth Guardians, and a representative of future
generations filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon to attempt to force action in an area of continuing injustice:
climate change.11 Similar to the plaintiffs in Brown, the young plaintiffs
in Juliana v. United States contended that government action violated
their constitutional rights.12 Specifically, their lawsuit sought to end the
“government’s affirmative actions that cause climate change”13 and
presented scientific evidence proving that the government’s fossil fuel
subsidies contribute directly to climate change.14 But the Ninth Circuit
claimed that the court could not issue such relief.15 Despite being nearer
to “the eve of destruction,”16 the court did nothing to curtail climate
change.17
The Juliana decision—like the Brown decision—will impact every
American’s life. Unfortunately, rather than initiating a positive societal
change like Brown, the Juliana decision will produce negative impacts if
allowed to stand. Climate change will continue to ravage the
environment and force citizens to deal with adverse health and
economic consequences.18 The anticipated changes to the environment
include more wildfires; “changes in surface, atmospheric, and oceanic
temperatures; melting glaciers; diminishing snow cover; shrinking sea
ice; rising sea levels; ocean acidification; and increasing atmospheric

8 CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 13 (2004).

See id. at 14.
NAACP, supra note 7.
11 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Juliana v.
United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC).
12 Legal Actions: Juliana v. United States, OUR CHILD.’S TR., https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
13 Id.
14 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2020).
15 Id. at 1175.
16 Id. at 1164.
17 See id. at 1164–65.
18 See 1 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH
NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT Volume I 10–11 (D.J. Wuebbles et al. eds., 4th ed. 2017).
9
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water vapor.”19
These environmental impacts have dangerous
ramifications for human health.20 Wildfires will cause more respiratory
and cardiovascular hospitalizations and thousands of deaths from
deteriorating outdoor and indoor air quality.21 Higher temperatures
and decreased snow cover will lead to more “frost-free days,” causing
further complications from asthma and increasing trips to the
emergency room.22 Extreme heat will result in people dying “from heat
stroke and related conditions, but also from cardiovascular disease,
respiratory disease, and cerebrovascular disease.”23 Air pollution from
greenhouse gases will cause diminished lung function, more instances
of asthma, and premature death.24 Dangerous health effects will plague
citizens as climate change intensifies and will continue to plague them
even after emissions begin to decrease.25
This Comment will examine the scientific evidence presented in
Juliana v. United States compared to that in Brown v. Board of Education
to discuss the court’s ability to provide relief based on that scientific
evidence. Specifically, this Comment will argue that the Juliana Court
had all the scientific evidence necessary to issue a wide-sweeping
proclamation like that in Brown. Part II outlines and compares the
decision and reasoning behind Brown and Juliana, respectively. Part III
lays out the scientific evidence presented in both Brown and Juliana.
Part IV details the general attitude that courts have taken towards
scientific evidence and contrasts how the courts in Brown and Juliana
chose to treat such evidence. Part V urges the Supreme Court to take the
case and overturn the Ninth Circuit’s decision. While this Comment will
focus on the United States, the impact of the Court’s decision will be felt
globally because the United States’ inaction and continued emissions of

Id. at 10.
See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 221 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014),
nca2014.globalchange.gov [hereinafter NCA].
21 Id. at 223. “[T]he extent of warming has not been uniform.” Id. at 8. The impacts
are also not felt equally. Somini Sengupta, Wildfire Smoke is Poisoning California’s Kids.
Some Pay a Higher Price., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/26/climate/california-smoke-children-health.html (comparing the
impact of wildfire smoke on children’s health based on location, pre-existing conditions,
and ability to relocate, among other factors).
22 NCA, supra note 20, at 222.
23 Id. at 224.
24 Id. at 222.
25 Id. at 8 (noting that continued higher emissions will likely result in a five-to-tendegree temperature rise by the end of the century while reducing emissions will still
result in a three-to-five-degree temperature rise).
19
20
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greenhouse gases will expedite climate change, leading to increased
harm worldwide.26
II. THE DECISIONS
Brown and Juliana both constitute impact litigation lawsuits
brought with the intent to accomplish broad societal change.27 Impact
litigation cases take a rights-based approach to remedy injustices and to
initiate the structural changes required to prevent others from suffering
those same injustices.28 Planned impact litigation requires a long-term
strategy and an “ideal client” whose remedy will put into motion the
envisioned objectives.29 The Brown and Juliana lawyers both found
“ideal clients” who would allow courts to extrapolate their remedies to
other similarly situated citizens.30 But while the Brown lawyers realized
their goal through a favorable decision, the Juliana lawyers encountered
a court content with maintaining the status quo.
A. Brown v. Board of Education
Brown v. Board of Education constituted impact litigation because
of its profound societal impact. Brown directly challenged Plessy v.
Ferguson, a case from nearly sixty years earlier that questioned the
constitutionality of a Louisiana law mandating segregated railway
cars.31 The Plessy Court found that segregation “neither abridges the
privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his
property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal
protection of the laws, within the meaning of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment.”32 The Court even compared segregated railroad cars to
segregated public schools, explaining that the constitutionality of the
latter “does not seem to have been questioned.”33 Consequently, the
majority in Plessy infamously held that separate but equal facilities were
constitutional.34
26 See id. at 340 (“Impacts due to climate change will cross community and regional
lines, making solutions dependent upon meaningful participation of numerous
stakeholders from federal, state, local, and tribal governments, science and academia,
the private sector, non-profit organizations, and the general public.”).
27 MACARENA SÁEZ, AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. L.: CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIANISM,
IMPACT LITIGATION: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 1 (2016).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896).
32 Id. at 548.
33 Id. at 550–51.
34 Id.
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The NAACP began its attack on the holding of Plessy v. Ferguson
with litigation concerning graduate school segregation, which brought
favorable outcomes early in its assault but never went so far as to
overrule Plessy.35 After the NAACP won these cases, they sought “to
apply the Supreme Court’s new understanding of inherent inequality to
elementary and secondary education” and coax the Court to overturn
Plessy.36 They consolidated cases from different jurisdictions to ensure
that an unusual set of facts would not prevent widespread applicability,
yet included enough commonalities to allow for a coordinated
strategy.37
Brown consisted of four suits brought in four different states—
Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware—by black elementaryand high-school-age children challenging the constitutionality of
segregation in public schools.38 The plaintiffs petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court to help them gain admission to the schools that white
children attended in their respective neighborhoods.39 The plaintiffs
contended that segregation deprived them of their Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection because “segregated public
schools are not ‘equal’ and cannot be made ‘equal.’”40
In Brown, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether Plessy v.
Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine applied to public education.41
Since the “tangible” factors of the schools were equal or were being
equalized, the opinion—authored by Chief Justice Warren—analyzed
the “effect of segregation itself on public education.”42 The Court began

35 See ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 115 (2003).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 119.
38 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486–87 (1954). In Kansas, the district court
in Brown v. Board of Education found that segregation has a detrimental effect on black
children but upheld the law because the black and white schools were “substantially
equal” in their physical facilities and quality of teachers. Id. at 486 n.1. In South Carolina,
the court in Briggs v. Elliott found that the schools that black children attended were
inferior to those of white children and ordered their equalization. Id. In Virginia, the
court in Davis v. County School Board also found that the schools that black children
attended were inferior and ordered them to remove the inequality. Id. at 487 n.1. In
Delaware, the court in Gebhart v. Belton found the facilities and teacher qualifications
inferior and that “segregation itself results in an inferior education” but merely ordered
equalization and allowed the black children admission to the white schools while
equalization took place. Id. at 487–88 n.1.
39 Id. at 487–88.
40 Id. at 488.
41 Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
42 Id. at 492 (noting some example of “tangible” factors: “buildings, curricula, [and]
qualifications and salaries of teachers”).
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its analysis by considering the Fourteenth Amendment and its “intended
effect on public education.”43 The Court quickly dismissed this
approach, however, because public education was not firmly
established at the time that Congress passed the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868.44 Since that time, legislatures enacted compulsory
attendance laws, catapulting education to one of the most important
functions of local government by the 1950s.45 The Court posited that “it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”46
After Chief Justice Warren established the importance of public
education in America, he presented the real issue: Does segregation
deprive black children of equal educational opportunities?47 The Court
answered this question in the affirmative by exploring three sources of
evidence documenting the effects of segregation in education.
First, the Court considered six cases that ruled on equal educational
opportunities in public schools, focusing particularly on the earlier
NAACP cases involving graduate schools.48 In Sweat v. Painter, the Court
held that a segregated law school “could not provide [black students]
equal educational opportunities.”49 In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, the Court examined “intangible considerations,” such as the
“ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other
students, and, in general, to learn his profession,” and ultimately decided
that segregation denied such opportunities.50 The Court in Brown
further asserted that such findings applied “with added force to
children” of elementary- and high-school-age.51
Second, the Court cited the findings of the district courts below that
segregation has detrimental effects on children.52 Specifically, in the
Kansas case, the court found that “[s]egregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children.”53 Similarly, the Delaware judge found the educational

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 489–90.
Id.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
See id. at 491–92.
Id. at 493.
Id. (quoting McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950)).
Id. at 494.
Id.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 294.
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opportunities offered to black children “substantially inferior” to those
presented to white children.54
Third, the Court explicitly rejected the psychological findings in
Plessy and cited seven social science papers and books in footnote
eleven to support this claim.55
The Supreme Court in Brown ultimately held that “in the field of
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”56 The Court
recognized the decision’s far-reaching implications and that the remedy
required “considerable complexity.”57 Accordingly, the Court allowed
additional time before issuing a remedy so that all parties could provide
input on the final decree.58 The Court published its remedy a year later,
in Brown II, on May 31, 1955.59 The decision declared that “[a]ll
provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such
discrimination must yield” to the principle that “racial discrimination in
public education is unconstitutional” and remanded to the lower courts
to create equitable decrees.60 The Court acknowledged that it might
take time to carry out the ruling effectively but urged lower courts to act
“with all deliberate speed.”61
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund credits the Brown decision as “a
major catalyst for the civil rights movement,” which made
desegregation efforts throughout the country possible.62 The decision
gave hope to millions of Americans oppressed by the racial caste system
that American governments implicitly or explicitly accepted.63
B. Juliana v. United States
Juliana v. United States, like Brown v. Board of Education,
constitutes impact litigation because its goal—phasing out fossil fuels—
has immense societal implications. Our Children’s Trust filed the
lawsuit in September 2015 on behalf of twenty-one youth plaintiffs from
ten different states.64 The plaintiffs came from states profoundly
Id. at 494 n.10.
Id. at 494–95 n.11.
56 Id. at 495.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 495–96.
59 Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
60 Id. at 298.
61 Id. at 300–01.
62 NAACP, supra note 7.
63 Id.
64 Juliana v. United States: Meet the Youth Plaintiffs, OUR CHILD.’S TR.,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/federal-plaintiffs/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
54
55
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impacted by climate change, 65 which allowed the lawyers to present
evidence of adverse environmental effects occurring throughout the
country. This decision parallels Brown, where the lawyers chose
plaintiffs from different school districts in different states who
experienced slightly different circumstances to ensure a ruling with
widespread applicability.66 Additionally, both cases litigate broad
constitutional rights by young plaintiffs looking to overturn policies
with long-term negative effects.
In Juliana, the plaintiffs were comprised of three different groups:
young citizens, an environmental organization,67 and “a representative
of future generations.”68 They filed a complaint seeking an order for the
government to develop a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emissions and
draw down excess atmospheric CO2 [sic].”69 The plaintiffs brought a
number of claims in the district court, but only three survived the
motion to dismiss for consideration at the appellate level.70 The district

65 Id. (noting that the plaintiffs reside in Oregon, Colorado, Florida, New York,
Hawaii, Arizona, Louisiana, Washington, Alaska, and Pennsylvania).
66 See supra, Section II.A.
67 Our Story, https://www.earthguardians.org/our-story, EARTH GUARDIANS (last
visited Sept. 3, 2021). Earth Guardians is “an intergenerational organization” with youth
at the forefront that “trains diverse youth to be effective leaders in the environmental,
climate and social justice movements across the globe.” Id.
68 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020); see Oliver Milman,
Ex-Nasa Scientist: 30 Years On, World is Failing ‘Miserably’ to Address Climate Change,
GUARDIAN (June 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jun/19/
james-hansen-nasa-scientist-climate-change-warning. Jim Hansen brings this lawsuit
as a guardian for future generations. This former NASA climate scientist first testified
to Congress in 1988 “with 99% confidence” that human activity caused global warming.
Since this testimony, Hansen retired from NASA and became an activist, urging the
government to take action to combat global warming before it becomes too late. Id.
69 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1164–65.
70 Id. at 1165. After the plaintiffs filed the complaint, the fossil fuel industry sought
to join the government as defendants to have the case dismissed. Juliana v. United States:
Major Court Orders and Filings, OUR CHILD.’S TR., https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/
court-orders-and-pleadings/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2021). On April 8, 2016, U.S. Magistrate
Judge Thomas Coffin recommended denial of the motion to dismiss. Legal Actions:
Juliana v. United States, OUR CHILD.’S TR., https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-vus (last visited Oct. 8, 2021). Judge Ann Aiken on the U.S. District Court for the District
of Oregon adopted Judge Coffin’s recommendation on November 10, 2016, and denied
the motions to dismiss. Id. The government filed an interlocutory appeal of the motion
to dismiss, which Judge Aiken denied on June 8, 2017. Id. Before the trial began, Judge
Coffin released the fossil fuel industry defendants, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stayed the district court proceedings, and the government filed a writ of mandamus
pertaining to the denial of the motion to dismiss. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
“drastic and extraordinary” writ of mandamus. Id. The government then filed an
application for a stay with the U.S. Supreme Court and requested the Court to review the
case. Id. The Court refused both requests, stating that it was “premature” to review the
case before the district court reviewed the facts. Id.
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court concluded that the plaintiffs stated a viable claim that the
government violated their Fifth Amendment due process right to a
“climate system capable of sustaining human life.”71 Additionally, the
court found a viable “danger-creation due process claim” from the
“government’s failure to regulate third-party emissions,” and a viable
public trust claim.72 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the
government’s petition for permission to appeal and focused its analysis
on whether the plaintiffs had standing and, specifically, whether their
claims were redressable.73
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by recognizing the plaintiff’s
evidence—an extensive scientific record that established that “climate
change is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace.”74 The court
acknowledged that “[c]opius expert evidence establishes” that fossil fuel
combustion leads to climate change and that the federal government has
known about the risks associated with fossil fuel emissions since as
early as 1965.75
The Ninth Circuit focused on whether the plaintiffs had Article III
standing to bring their claims, which requires (1) “a concrete and
particularized injury that (2) is caused by the challenged conduct and
(3) is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision.”76 The court
confirmed that at least some of the plaintiffs claimed concrete and
particularized injuries adequate under Article III.77 The plaintiffs also
satisfied the causation requirement because between 1850 and 2012,
the United States accounted for 25 percent of fossil fuel emissions
worldwide and about 25 percent of those emissions received
authorization from the federal government.78 Therefore, the plaintiffs
presented a genuine factual dispute regarding whether the government
played a substantial role in causing the plaintiffs’ injuries.79
Consequently, the court spent a majority of its analysis on the third

Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1165.
Id.
73 Id. at 1164, 1168.
74 Id. at 1166.
75 Id. at 1166 (noting that the evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs on the appeal of a motion to dismiss).
76 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1168.
77 Id. (specifying examples of a plaintiff “forced to leave her home because of water
scarcity” and another who was forced to “evacuate his coastal home multiple times
because of flooding”).
78 Id. at 1169.
79 Id.
71
72
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requirement—whether an Article III court may redress the plaintiffs’
injuries.80
“‘Redressability’ concerns whether a federal court is capable of
vindicating a plaintiff’s legal rights.”81 The Juliana plaintiffs requested
“an injunction requiring the government not only to cease permitting,
authorizing, and subsidizing fossil fuel use, but also to prepare a plan
subject to judicial approval to draw down harmful emissions.”82 The
district court recognized that this goal requires more than the
government ceasing to promote fossil fuels,83 but still found
redressability satisfied because the relief would reduce emissions,
thereby slowing the harmful effects of climate change.84
On appeal, the plaintiffs conceded that their requested redress
would not solve climate change entirely, but they maintained that it
would mitigate their injuries.85 The Ninth Circuit expressed skepticism
toward this claim but proposed that even if the court could provide
actual redress, the “competing social, political, and economic forces”
must be reserved to the power of the Legislature.86 Separation of
powers required that the court defer to Executive or Legislative
judgments on such complex matters.87 Alternatively, the court posited
that even if it did issue a remedy, it would require extensive court
supervision to ensure compliance, which could potentially upset the
balance of power between the courts and other branches of

Id. at 1169–70. The Supreme Court has articulated that the purpose of issuing a
remedy to correct a societal injustice includes prohibiting new violations, as well as
“eliminat[ing] the continuing effects of past violations.” Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and
Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 589 (1983). But other times the court merely tries to
prohibit past effects to “the greatest possible degree.” Id. The Court in Brown II required
an imperfect injunctive remedy—”delayed desegregation”—which the public met with
widespread resistance, demonstrating the challenges of effectuating injunctive relief. Id.
at 609. Simply crafting an appropriate remedy takes time and necessarily delays or even
prohibits justice for some members of the class facing the injustice. See id. at 614. In
fact, hundreds of desegregation orders remain open throughout the United States today,
over fifty years after Brown. See Yue Qiu & Nikole Hannah-Jones, A National Survey of
School
Desegregation
Orders,
PROPUBLICA (Dec.
23,
2014),
https://
projects.propublica.org/graphics/desegregation-orders.
81 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1181 (Staton, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 1170 (noting that this relief would “enjoin the Executive from exercising
discretionary authority expressly granted by Congress” and “enjoin Congress from
exercising power expressly granted by the Constitution”).
83 Id. at 1170–71.
84 Id. at 1171.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1171–72 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128–29
(1992).
87 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1172.
80
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government.88 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did
not satisfy the constitutional Article III standing requirement and
remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss, urging the
plaintiffs to make their case to the political branch or to the electorate.89
Judge Staton wrote a passionate dissent to the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion.90 She began by declaring that “the government bluntly insists
that it has the absolute and unreviewable power to destroy the
Nation.”91 She invoked the perpetuity principle, which “prohibits only
the willful dissolution of the Republic,”92 and gives the government
“more than just a nebulous ‘moral responsibility’ to preserve the
Nation,”93 because without it, any liberties that the Constitution protects
become meaningless.94 Given the evidence presented by the plaintiffs,
the continued use of fossil fuels will cause irreversible changes,
presenting an “existential threat” to the Nation never before seen, which
the government actively endorses.95 Judge Staton acknowledged that
the right at issue concerns stopping climate change from proceeding
beyond a tipping point from which the Nation may not return—not
stopping climate change altogether.96 Consequently, she would hold
that “under Article III, a perceptible reduction in the advance of climate
change is sufficient to redress a plaintiff’s climate change-induced
harms.”97
Judge Staton further invoked the power of judicial review to thwart
the majority’s concerns about abuse of the separation of powers,
insisting that federal courts must construct the proper relief to legal
wrongs and instruct other branches on the limits of their constitutional
power.98 She rebuked the majority’s invocation of the political question
doctrine because courts have instituted “widespread, programmatic
changes in government functions” in the past, citing Brown v. Board of

See id.
Id. at 1175.
90 See id. at 1175–91 (Staton, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 1175.
92 Id. at 1179.
93 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1177.
94 Id. at 1178.
95 See id. at 1180 (“[I]t should come as no surprise that the Constitution’s
commitment to perpetuity only now faces judicial scrutiny, for never before has the
United States confronted an existential threat [climate change] that has not only gone
unremedied but is actively backed by the government.”).
96 Id. at 1182.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1184.
88
89
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Education, among other notable court decisions.99 The dissent
proclaims that “resolution of this action requires answers only to
scientific questions, not political ones.”100 “Plaintiffs’ claims are based
on science, specifically, an impending point of no return. If plaintiffs’
fears, backed by the government’s own studies, prove true, history will
not judge us kindly.”101
III. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN BROWN AND JULIANA
The plaintiffs in Brown presented social scientific evidence to
support their claims, while the plaintiffs in Juliana presented natural
scientific evidence to support their claims. Although courts may have
been reluctant in the past to accept scientific evidence, today, both
natural and social science present compelling reasons to issue a remedy
in favor of scientific truth. The Ninth Circuit should have taken this
approach and used the overwhelming science behind climate change to
issue the plaintiffs their requested relief.
A. Brown v. Board of Education Scientific Evidence
In the fifty-eight years after Plessy v. Ferguson, social scientific
studies surrounding segregation emerged that directly contradicted the
Court’s findings.102 The Court in Plessy proclaimed that segregation by
race does not assign a “badge of inferiority” to people of color, but rather
that any feeling of inferiority comes from the construction that they
themselves assign to it.103 The Plessy Court claimed that “[l]egislation is
powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based
upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.”104 Further, the
decision proclaimed that “[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially,
the [C]onstitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same
plane.”105 Today, society understands the blatant falsity of these claims,
but when deciding Brown, the Court faced a challenge to issue a decision
that would persuade the public.

99 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1188 (noting the overhaul of prisons in California to uphold
the “Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment” and racially
integrating public schools to uphold the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection).
100 Id. at 1189.
101 Id. at 1191.
102 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
103 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 552.
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The lawyers in the early higher education cases predating Brown
specifically introduced expert psychological testimony to the Court to
demonstrate “the importance to the educational experience of
intangibles that were incapable of objective measurement.”106 In Brown,
the NAACP used “psychologists, social scientists, and other experts” to
demonstrate the psychological injuries of segregation, to force the
Justices to grapple with the realities of segregation, and to stop them
from engaging in “spurious rationalizations” of the Fourteenth
Amendment.107
Two of the Brown district court judges concluded that segregation
in public schools had a detrimental effect on black children, but either
ignored that finding in their final decisions, or their decisions did not
rest upon that finding explicitly.108 For example, Brown v. Board of
Education in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas found that
segregation in public schools did have a detrimental effect on black
children.109 The court, however, denied relief because it also found that
the physical facilities, curricula, and the qualifications of teachers were
“substantially equal.”110 The Delaware Court of Chancery in Gebhart v.
Belton found that “segregation itself results in an inferior education for
Negro children.”111 The court did not rely on this finding to admit the
black children into the schools attended by white children.112 Rather,
the court rested its decision on finding that the schools that black
children attended had inferior physical accommodations and inferior
teacher training.113 The court, therefore, preserved the possibility of resegregating the schools upon equalization of the facilities.114
The Supreme Court, however, did rest its holding on the negative
psychological effects of segregation.
The Court declared that
“[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the
time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [a detrimental effect on black
children] is amply supported by modern authority.”115 Footnote eleven
in the Brown decision lists seven social science sources that explore
these harmful psychological effects of segregation.116 The declaration in
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

COTTROL, supra note 35, at 122.
Id. at 123.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 494–95 n.11.
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Plessy that any inferiority that black people felt came from the
construction that they put on themselves was exposed for its incredible
ignorance and willful blindness to the actual state of the world. The next
seven sources listed allowed the Court to declare the very premise of
Plessy untrue and allowed for a unanimous judicial decree in Brown.
A famous study by social psychologist Kenneth Clark is the first
source cited in footnote eleven.117 He found that black children in
segregated schools experienced feelings of self-rejection.118 In the
study, Clark presented children with four dolls: two brown and two
white.119 He asked the children to choose a doll based on various
criteria: who they would like to play with, who was nice, who was bad,
and what doll was a nicer color.120 Black children consistently chose
white dolls as “nice” and the dolls with whom they preferred to play, and
they designated the brown dolls as “bad.”121 Another test gave children
objects to color—such as a leaf or an apple—and if they used the correct
color, the study moved on to the next stage.122 Black children tasked
with coloring themselves most often used white, yellow, or some other
non-skin color, like red or green.123 These results reinforced the
conclusion that black children felt inferior and rejected their own race
when exposed to segregation.
The second source, The Fact-Finding Report of the Midcentury
White House Conference on Children and Youth, outlined requirements
“for the healthy development of the whole personality.”124 The report
found that if others do not treat a child with respect, he learns that he
and others like him are not worthy of respect.125 Children may also
develop feelings of hatred toward those who disrespect them.126 After
laying out these general findings, the report applied them specifically to
schools.127 Since a school strives to enable children to understand their
world better, “the school has a role which is not only strategic but

Id. at 494–95 n.11.
COTTROL, supra note 35, at 125.
119 Id. at 124.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 124–25.
124 HELEN LELAND WITMER & RUTH KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING: THE FACT-FINDING
REPORT OF THE MIDCENTURY WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH 237 (Harper &
Brothers, Publishers 1952).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 257–58.
117
118
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indispensable in the development of the healthy personality.”128 A
child’s experience in school can “either enhance or undermine whatever
basic sense of trust, of independence, and of initiative the child brings
with him from his earlier life at home.”129 A conflict exists between the
democratic tradition that schools generally promote and the
antidemocratic practices, such as segregation, that they often adopt.130
The third and fourth sources detail a survey exploring the
psychological effects of enforced legal segregation on both the group
being segregated and the group establishing the segregation.131 This
study aimed to publish information that the Supreme Court could
eventually use and, therefore, limited itself to the issue relevant in a case
like Brown: whether enforced segregation has detrimental effects “when
equal facilities are provided for the segregated groups.”132 Deutscher
and Chien distributed a questionnaire to social scientists—
anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists—and received a high
response rate from their targeted population.133 The paper begins with
an in-depth analysis of how the authors conducted the study, making
sure to note that respondents could choose to remain anonymous,
which served to bolster the study’s persuasiveness and legitimacy.134
Ninety percent of social scientists agreed that segregation was harmful,
and of that 90 percent, only 10 percent indicated that they did not know
of a “positive basis for their opinions.”135 The study then explained how
segregation specifically affects black school children developmentally:
the children show psychological reactions related to status differences
of segregation long before they appreciate differences in physical
facilities.136 One psychologist pointed to the “ambiguity” created in the
United States, which boasts itself as a free and equal society but then
turns around and subordinates an entire class of people.137 This source
Id. at 257.
Id.
130 Id. at 258 (noting that “the antidemocratic end of each conflict is harmful to
personality”).
131 Max Deutscher & Isidor Chien, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation:
A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCH. 259, 259 (1948); Isidor Chein, What are
the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, INT’L J. OP.
AND ATTITUDE RSCH. 3 (1949), reprinted in 16 INT’L J. PUB. OP. RSCH. 1, 84 (2004).
132 See id. at 259–60.
133 Id. at 262.
134 See id. at 260–64.
135 Isidor Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of
Equal Facilities?, INT’L J. OP. AND ATTITUDE RSCH. 3 (1949), reprinted in 16 INT’L J. PUB. OP.
RSCH. 1, 84 (2004).
136 Id. at 85.
137 Deutscher, supra note 131, at 272.
128
129
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revealed that the field of social science understood that segregation
created feelings of inferiority and detrimental effects in black school
children.
The fifth source explores the social losses associated with
segregation through the lens of an inadequately educated population,
which not only hurts the individuals deprived of the education but also
the Nation as a whole through the costs of a poorly trained workforce.138
Brameld describes education as the “greatest loser” of discrimination
because “children and adults of different races, religions, [and]
nationalities fail to enrich one another” and “cultural learning is
narrowed and distorted.”139 “Social neurosis” exemplifies another
deleterious effect of segregation, as parents of white children encourage
“frustration and aggression” in their children, which acts as another
impediment for black children.140 The numerous costs of desegregation
ultimately lead to “concomitant learnings” that “injure the majority
groups of America even more than they do the minorities” as children
develop prejudice, distrust, and guilt.141 The article ends with a call to
action to combat these negative social costs, including challenging the
constitutionality of segregated schools up to the Supreme Court: a goal
realized by Brown.142
The Court points to two chapters in the sixth source—The Negro in
the United States—that further describe the general effects of
discrimination within society.143 The first chapter that the Court noted
proclaims that “separate but equal educational and other facilities has
never worked out in practice.”144 Such limitations have oppressed black
children, and such oppression followed them into adulthood, limiting
their role in the “economic and social life of the [N]ation.”145 Further,
the isolation between the two races caused each side to accept social
stereotypes of the other, often perpetuating the idea of black
“intellectual inferiority” while exalting “emotional gifts.”146 These
misunderstandings and stereotypes led to a black inferior minority
status within the United States, although the book explains that

138 Theodore Brameld, Educational Costs, in DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE 44
(MacIver ed., 1949).
139 Id. at 45.
140 Id.
141 Id.at 46–47.
142 Id. at 47.
143 E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 674 (1949).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 677.
146 Id.
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generally, black people do not think of themselves as “possessing a
different culture from whites.”147
Finally, the Court cites An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem
and Modern Democracy.148 This book provides an extensive social
analysis of the problematic race relations permeating all aspects of
society in the United States during the early twentieth century.149 The
author presents evidence that the education available to black children
is “undernourished and inadequate” and that purging the Nation of
inequality in public education is essential for the American economy
and economic policy.150 “Segregation is usually not motivated by
financial reasons but as a precaution against social equality.”151 America
deems education the best way to improve society and the best way to
advance social status.152 Many black children, however, become
frustrated with the educational system and drop out at higher rates than
their white counterparts.153 Consequently, the inadequate educational
opportunities that the public education system offers black children
hold them back and make it harder for them to advance their social
position.154
The seven sources listed in footnote eleven in Brown v. Board of
Education provide the scientific evidence necessary for the historical
holding. The Court amplified what social scientists, psychologists, and
sociologists already knew: segregated schools harm black school
children.
B. Juliana v. United States Scientific Evidence
The United States has a complicated relationship with climate
change—often splitting people among political lines—and some citizens
remain skeptical towards the scientific evidence that experts use to
establish its existence or severity.155 While climate change skepticism
may continue in the United States politically, the judiciary has generally

Id. at 680–81.
Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 n.11 (1954).
149 See 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY, at liii–lv (1944).
150 Id. at 906–07.
151 Id. at 901.
152 Id. at 882–83.
153 Id. at 884.
154 Id.
155 See Maria L. Banda, Climate Science in the Courts: A Review of U.S. and International
Judicial Pronouncements, ENV’T L. INST. 1 (2020).
147
148
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acknowledged the legitimacy of climate change science and that global
warming’s changes will have future negative impacts.156
In Juliana, the plaintiffs established that climate change is
occurring at an increasing pace and that fossil fuel combustion is
causing this increase.157 They submitted hard scientific evidence that
proves that fossil fuel emissions account for “most of the increase in
atmospheric CO2,” and this increased CO2 constitutes the “main cause of
global warming.”158 Absolute amounts of CO2 continue to rise, and the
rate of increase of CO2 continues to rise as well—currently sitting at
nearly twice the rate as when humans first recorded it.159 This CO2 has
detrimental effects on Americans throughout the United States,
although the exact adverse effects may differ.160 Wildfire season has
been dramatically affected—scientists documented that the wildfire
season grew by eighty-seven days in 2006 compared to the 1980s, with
four times the number of large fires and six times the number of acres
burned.161 Climate change exacerbated the 2017 Atlantic hurricane
season, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico, where storms were
“abnormally strong.”162 Dr. James Hansen submitted evidence that
showed the projected impacts of rising sea levels in six states that will
either flood or completely impact the livability of homes in those
areas.163 The hottest years since record-keeping began in the United
States have all occurred in the past decade, and “each year since 1997
has been hotter than the previous average.”164
In addition to general evidence of the existence of anthropogenic
climate change, the Juliana plaintiffs offered specific evidence that the
government directly contributes to the CO2 released into the
atmosphere and has known of its dangers for decades.165 The federal
government leases over “five million acres of National Forest lands” to
develop “oil, natural gas, coal, and phosphate,” and twenty-seven million
acres of the Outer Continental Shelf for oil and gas.166 The government
Id. at 1, 3 (calling climate science “the ultimate lingua franca across jurisdictions”).
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020).
158 Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1089 (D. Or. 2018).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1087–88 (noting the various concrete injuries alleged by the plaintiffs, which
include personal injuries and emotional trauma, among others, caused by extreme
weather events, flooding, climate destabilization, and ocean acidification).
161 Id. at 1089 n.8.
162 Id. at 1089 (noting Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria).
163 Id. at 1089–90. The six states are Louisiana, Oregon, Washington, Florida, New
York, and Hawaii.
164 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1166.
165 Id. at 1164.
166 Juliana, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 1092.
156
157
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explicitly authorized the depletion of the country’s carbon
sequestration capacity: the “Department of Agriculture authorized the
harvest of 525,484,148 billion board feet of timber from federal land,”
and the government “permit[s] livestock grazing on over 95 million
acres of National Forest lands in 26 states.”167 The plaintiffs submitted
many of the government’s own reports into evidence, including the
Fourth National Climate Assessment developed by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”).168 The Johnson
Administration knew about the harmful effects of CO2 emissions,
warning as early as 1965 that they could cause “significant changes to
climate, global temperatures, sea levels, and other stratospheric
properties.”169 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued a
report in 1983 that projected a two-degree Celsius increase in
temperature by 2040 and warned “that a ‘wait and see’ carbon
emissions policy was extremely risky.”170 The EPA urged the
government to act in the 1990s to reduce fossil fuel emissions, but these
emissions have continued to climb ever since.171
The Answer provided by the federal defendants agreed with many
of the plaintiffs’ key factual and scientific evidence.172 Among the
numerous concessions, the government acknowledged that for over
fifty years, federal government officials have been aware that higher
concentrations of atmospheric CO2 could cause “long-lasting changes to
the global climate” that would have “severe and deleterious effects to
human beings, which will worsen over time.”173
The federal
government “permit[s], authorize[s], and subsidize[s] fossil fuel
extraction, development, consumption, and exportation,” which has
increased atmospheric CO2 concentration.174 “Climate change is
damaging human and natural systems, increasing the risk of loss of life,
and requiring adaptation on larger and faster scales than current
species have successfully achieved in the past, potentially increasing the
risk of extinction or severe disruption for many species.”175 Finally, the

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id.
Banda, supra note 155, at 61.
Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1166.
Id.
Id.
Juliana, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 1072.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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government conceded that “human activity is likely to have been the
dominant cause of observed warming since the mid-1900s.”176
IV. TREATMENT OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The following section explores how courts have traditionally
treated scientific evidence, which reveals a history of reluctance. As
time progressed towards Brown and Juliana, however, courts became
more accepting of the social and natural sciences. This increased
acceptance of scientific evidence should allow the Supreme Court to
grant the Juliana evidence enough weight to overturn the Ninth Circuit.
A. How Courts Generally Treat Scientific Evidence
Courts have historically been reluctant to rely on scientific
evidence. “The dominant criticism of law is that it is indeterminate,
incoherent and contradictory.”177 As the law seeks to gain more
legitimacy, legal realists propose that the law should shift to a more
scientific jurisprudence.178 Early in its history, the Supreme Court did
not often recognize a need to verify its factual beliefs.179 Rather, factfinding constituted another “form of constitutional argument, used to
shape and justify certain outcomes.”180 The Court’s inconsistent use of
science may result from its use of “normative legal judgment,” instead
of approaching science as a separate, fact-gathering inquiry.181 Where
the Court interprets an issue as an “empirical question,” however, the
Court appears more receptive to use scientific facts to support a
holding.182
“Science has one main advantage over the other sources of
interpretation: replicability.”183 Scientists apply the scientific method
and take measures to minimize subjective bias in their research, which
ultimately must be capable of reproduction by peers.184 To consider a
Id.
J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court
and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 137 (1990).
178 Id.
179 David Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 550 (1991).
180 Id. at 556.
181 Id. at 549.
182 See id. at 567 (“The question presented, therefore, is why did the Brown Court
believe it helpful to rely on social science in any measure, rather than the ‘bedrock of a
coherent constitutional principle’? The simple explanation, it would seem, is that the
equal protection clause, as interpreted by the Court, raises an empirical question.”).
183 Id. at 606.
184 Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Speaking Science to Law, 25 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV.
289, 292 (2013).
176
177
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claim objective, the scientific community applies “rigorous application
of the standard empirical method,” which roots itself in skepticism.185
The scientific method demands “an ongoing process of refinement and
testing” that ultimately produces an improved product over time.186
Refinement in the social sciences allowed the Brown Court to
definitively declare the social effects of segregation proclaimed in Plessy
untrue.
Relying on scientific evidence raises the valid concern that the
science may not be factually accurate or may be subject to competing
and conflicting interpretations.187 While such concerns have merit, the
ultimate conclusions drawn from the scientific evidence presented in
both Brown and Juliana remain uncontested.188
B. How the Brown Court Treated Scientific Evidence
The Brown Court presented scientific evidence succinctly, refused
to acknowledge any false prior views, and definitively decided that the
evidence demanded action.189 Using scientific evidence, the Court
rejected the reasoning of Plessy v. Ferguson in two sentences: “Whatever
may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, [Brown’s] finding is amply supported by modern
authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected.”190 The Court supported this conclusion by using the lower
courts’ findings, as well as other case findings, only adding novel social
science support in footnote eleven.191 Placing this scientific evidence in
a footnote does not diminish the findings, but rather amplifies them
when considered within the historical and political environment in
which the Chief Justice wrote the opinion. Chief Justice Warren stated,

Id. at 303.
KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS 162 (1997).
187 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993). This case
reexamined the “standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial,”
replacing the Frye test, which required a scientific principle or discovery to have gained
“general acceptance” within its field. Id. at 582, 586. Rather, the Rules of Evidence
created a standard that called for reliable and relevant scientific evidence. Id. at 597.
188 See Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1072 (D. Or. 2018) (noting that
the government’s answer “agreed with many of the scientific and factual allegations in
the First Amended Complaint”).
189 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954) (rejecting any
psychological knowledge present in Plessy contrary to the social scientific evidence
presented within the Brown opinion).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 494–95 n.11.
185
186
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“It was only a note, after all,”192 but one must question how much he
agreed with his own statement when accounting for the importance of
a unanimous decision to give the Court credence in the South. Chief
Justice Warren may have understated footnote eleven to maintain the
Court’s unanimous decision and to avoid placing the Southern Justices
in a position where they could not support the decision.193 Alternatively,
the evidence of psychological harm may have helped convince the
Southern Justices to agree with the majority by providing a better
understanding of the human toll that segregation had on children194
because they could imagine the school children as their own children
and grandchildren.195
Perhaps the strongest argument for the importance of the social
science presented is that it did not need to be included: the lower court
findings, along with the higher education decisions, could have carried
the opinion.196 Chief Justice Warren, however, included this footnote to
provide concrete evidence that segregation had harmful effects on
children, thereby giving the decision the evidentiary support that it
needed to usher in colossal societal change.197
The only support that the Brown court offered between the real
issue presented—”does segregation . . . deprive the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities”—and its holding
was the social science evidence from the district courts and footnote
eleven.198 Therefore, the Brown decision ultimately turned on this new
scientific evidence and the Court’s recognition of the negative
psychological effects on children. No other basis was necessary—nor
provided—to legitimize the decision.

192 KLUGER, supra note 2, at 709. Earl Pollock, Chief Justice Warren’s clerk and “one of
the closest to the writing of the opinion,” noted, “[t]he Chief Justice was saying in effect
that we know a lot more now about how human beings work than they did back then
and can therefore cast doubt on [Plessy’s] preposterous line of argument.” Id.
193 Id.
194 Neil G. Williams, Brown v. Board of Education Fifty Years Later: What Makes for
Greatness in a Legal Opinion?, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 188 (2004).
195 Id.
196 See Faigman, supra note 179, at 566 (suggesting that the “studies were not
necessary to the holding”).
197 See id. at 570 (noting that “[i]n Brown . . . the issue of segregation’s effects had
been an integral component of the preceding interpretive tradition” and so “the research
cited in Brown ‘fit’ into the interpretive tradition of querying the effects of segregation”).
198 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–95, 494–95 n.11 (1954).
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C. Treatment of Scientific Evidence and the Resulting Remedy:
Juliana versus Brown
Contrary to the Brown decision, the Juliana court acknowledged
that the science presented a dire situation, but it did not use this science
as a basis for its decision. Judge Ann Aiken, who wrote the trial court
opinion, invoked Marbury v. Madison when considering a challenge of
the government—it is “emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”199 She recognized that while
courts must remain wary not to overstep their jurisdiction, courts have
“an equally important duty to fulfill their role as a check on any
unconstitutional actions of the other branches of government.”200
In the Ninth Circuit, Judge Staton’s dissent compared the order
required by the Juliana case to the desegregation orders issued in the
Brown II decision.201 The Brown II Court provided reprieve “without
exceeding the Judiciary’s province.”202 Judge Staton further argued that:
[T]he Supreme Court was explicitly unconcerned with the fact
that crafting relief would require individualized review of
thousands of state and local policies that facilitated
segregation. Rather, a unanimous Court held that the
judiciary could work to dissemble segregation over time while
remaining cognizant of the many public interests at stake.203
While partially realizing the promise of Brown took decades, Judge
Staton acknowledged that as “the slow churn of constitutional
vindication did not dissuade the Brown Court,” it likewise should not
have dissuaded the Juliana court.204 Judge Staton leaned on the judicial
orders in Brown, and other cases, to find “judicially discernable
standards” to assist the court in providing a remedy.205
The remedies sought in Brown and Juliana both seek institutional
change from policies that violate a constitutional right. The plaintiffs in
Brown were denied admission to their local public schools because
white children attended them, and they wanted admission to these
schools on a nonsegregated basis.206 The plaintiffs contended that
Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1085 (D. Or. 2018) (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
200 Id. at 1085–86.
201 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1176 (9th Cir. 2020) (Staton, J.,
dissenting).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1188.
204 Id. at 1189.
205 Id. at 1188 (also noting California prison reform in Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493,
511 (2011)).
206 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1954).
199
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segregation deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment right of
equal protection of the laws because “segregated public schools are not
‘equal’ and cannot be made ‘equal.’”207
Brown’s remedy required federal-, state-, and local-level
governments to revise, rewrite, or eliminate policies to effectuate public
school integration.208 The Brown Court stated that “[s]chool authorities
have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles.”209 Brown required each local
school district to end its policy of segregation, which caused thousands
of schools to overhaul their policies.210 Courts faced particularly hard
challenges evaluating these policies because they needed to consider
local particularities when crafting decrees to transition from a
discriminatory system.211 Any school that did not make a good faith
effort faced the possibility of court proceedings to implement
desegregation.212 Even though the courts issued mandates from a
centralized position of power, progress happened slowly because of the
decentralized nature of school boards and strong resistance from
Southern officials and legislatures.213
The Brown Court infamously ordered the school districts “to admit
to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all
deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”214 Some commentators
posit that the Court “ordered the [N]ation to make haste slowly,” and
effectively delayed the enjoyment of the constitutional right it had just
declared.215 Brown faced immense obstacles in its implementation from
the executive, as well as from the Southern states, where “all deliberate
speed meant any conceivable delay.”216 But, while the opposition may

Id. at 488.
Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298.
209 Id. at 299.
210 Id. (“School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing,
and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school
authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles.”).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 COTTROL, supra note 35, at 189–90 (noting that some Southern legislatures even
enacted statutes designed to thwart desegregation).
214 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
215 Julian Bond, With All Deliberate Speed: Brown v. Board of Education, 90 IND. L.J.
1671, 1676 (2015).
216 Id.
207
208
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have delayed this plan, today nobody doubts that the Court had the
authority to issue the remedy.
The Juliana plaintiffs claimed that the government violated their
Fifth Amendment due process rights to a “climate system capable of
sustaining human life” by subsidizing fossil fuels.217 The plaintiffs’
proposed remedy in their amended complaint included nine prayers for
relief that involved both declaratory and injunctive demands.218
Specifically, the plaintiffs petitioned the court to order the defendants to
“prepare and implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase
out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2 so as
to stabilize the climate system and protect the vital resources on which
Plaintiffs now and in the future will depend.”219 Further, the plaintiffs
requested that the court “monitor and enforce Defendants’ compliance
with the national remedial plan.”220
This prayer for relief only implicates emissions controlled at the
national level, although many CO2 emissions come from sources that
cannot be controlled nationally.221 Approximately 80 percent of the
energy in the United States comes from fossil fuels.222 In 2019 the
largest source of CO2 emissions in the United States came from
transportation—mainly passenger cars and light-duty trucks—which
account for over half of transportation emissions.223 The EPA suggests
three different ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: (1) “fuel
switching,” which “improv[es] fuel efficiency with advanced design,
materials, and technologies,” (2) “improving operating practices,” and
(3) “reducing travel demand.”224 The EPA and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) develop emissions standards
for cars and light-duty trucks, putting these emissions directly within
the purview of federal authority.225 Consequently, courts may hold the
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2020).
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 94–95, Juliana
v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC).
219 Id. at 94.
220 Id.
221 See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, [hereinafter Sources of GHG]
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited
Jan. 14, 2021).
222 Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1093 (D. Or. 2018).
223 Sources of GHG, supra note 221 (transportation tab).
224 Id. Fuel switching includes replacing current fuel with any fuel that emits less CO2
than is currently being used—while this may often include alternative, renewable
sources of energy, the EPA also mentions “fossil fuels that are less CO2-intensive than
the fuels that they replace.” Id.
225 Regulations for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Passenger Cars and Trucks, EPA
https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-greenhouse-gas-emissions-passenger-cars-and (last visited Oct. 9, 2021).
217
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federal government directly accountable for lowering CO2 emissions
through more stringent fuel standards.226 While these standards would
not include all CO2 emissions from transportation, it would constitute a
sizable step in curbing emissions.
The second highest source of CO2 emissions comes from electricity
generation.227 Although the overall percentage of coal used to generate
electricity is falling as renewables continue to rise,228 coal remains a
major source of generation.229 Coal combustion introduces several
harmful substances into the atmosphere, including sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, particulates, carbon dioxide, mercury, and other heavy
metals.230 Because electricity generation is traditionally an area of state
authority, opportunities to curb emissions are less likely to exist
exclusively at the federal level.231 This dichotomy means that any
potential remedies regarding electricity generation will depend on
decentralized state agencies to implement changes, although the bright
line between federal and state jurisdiction has become more blurry with
recent technological innovations232 and with market developments.233
The third highest source of CO2 emissions comes from the industry
sector, which produces everyday goods and raw materials for
consumers.234 This sector consists of direct and indirect emissions,
226 See Regulations for Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-greenhouse-gas-ghg-emissions (last visited Oct. 9, 2021) (including federal regulations for light-duty passenger
cars and trucks, commercial trucks and buses, aircraft, and federal fleets).
227 Sources of GHG, supra note 221 (electricity tab).
228 Electricity Mix in the United States, Q1 2020, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://
www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/electricity-mix-in-the-united-states-q1-2020
(last visited Oct. 9, 2021).
229 What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last visited Oct. 9, 2021); see
also Sources of GHG, supra note 221 (electricity tab) (“[N]on-fossil sources, such as
nuclear, hydroelectric, wind and solar, are non-emitting.”).
230 Coal Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
coal/coal-and-the-environment.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2021).
231 JEFFERY S. DENNIS, SUEDEEN G. KELLY, ROBERT R. NORDHAUS & DOUGLAS W. SMITH,
FEDERAL/STATE JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGING ELECTRICITY TECHNOLOGIES, at
v (2016) (explaining that the Federal Powers Act authorizes the federal government to
regulate “wholesale sales and transmission in interstate commerce,” while the states
regulate “generation, distribution, and retail sales”).
232 Id. at v–vi.
233 See FERC Proposes Policy Statement on State-Determined Carbon Pricing in
Wholesale Markets, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.ferc.gov/
news-events/news/ferc-proposes-policy-statement-state-determined-carbon-pricingwholesale-markets (clarifying that FERC “has jurisdiction over organized wholesale
electric market rules that incorporate a state-determined carbon price in those
markets”).
234 Sources of GHG, supra note 221 (industry tab).
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depending on whether the emissions come from the facility or offsite.235
Opportunities to reduce emissions in this industry include upgrading to
more fuel-efficient technology, switching fuel sources, recycling, and
training and awareness.236 Such control may exist in the current Clean
Air Act, or these solutions could come from new legislation that gives
the federal government power.237 Absent any such remedies, however,
these solutions will likely need to come from the state level.
Considering the three largest sources of CO2 emissions—
transportation, electricity generation, and industry—the nature of
Juliana’s remedy largely involves the federal government and federal
agencies with centralized power. The original Juliana lawsuit sought
only a 6 percent reduction in emissions per year,238 which would allow
initial orders from the issuing court to focus on federal solutions.
Federal relief seeks action at a higher level of government than in Brown,
where “revision of local laws and regulations” was necessary.239 This
difference decreases the sheer number of changes required to redress
the Juliana plaintiffs—every school district in the country does not
require an order to act. Such a remedy, while sweeping in its effects,
does not impinge as high of a burden on the judiciary as the accepted
order made by the Brown Court. While federal regulations and policies
will not solve climate change in its entirety, states can issue additional
remedies, still providing a more centralized base than the local school
districts in Brown.
The Julianna court should have treated the scientific evidence
presented to it just as the Brown court did and initiated court action.
The Brown court accepted that science needed to inform the court and
help fashion its remedy, even though that scientific evidence originated
from the realm of social science, which typically has been considered
less objective.240 As demonstrated in the discussion above, courts—
including the Court in Brown—have used multiple studies showing the
Id.
Id.
237 See
Clean
Air
Act
Permitting
for
Greenhouse
Gases,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/nsr/clean-air-act-permitting-greenhouse-gases (listing actions
that the EPA has taken to “explain the next steps in GHG permitting”).
238 Oliver Milman, Ex-Nasa Scientist: 30 Years on, World Is Failing ‘Miserably’ to
Address Climate Change, GUARDIAN (June 19, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jun/19/james-hansen-nasa-scientistclimate-change-warning.
239 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added).
240 See David Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 550 (1991);
see also id. at 604 (“In principle, the social sciences can be as objective and scientific as
their more heralded cousins, the natural sciences.”).
235
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same or similar impacts to mimic the reproducibility that exists within
the natural sciences. That the Juliana court did not use science to help
devise a remedy becomes even more surprising when compared to
Brown because the veracity of the natural scientific evidence presented
in Juliana was easily authenticated and even admitted by the
government.241 This difference demonstrates the reluctance of courts
to rely on scientific evidence and points to the necessary remedy: for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in the Juliana case and, using Brown
as a framework, ground their final decision in climate science. The
remedy that the Juliana plaintiffs requested exists largely at the federal
level, which makes a court-ordered remedy easier to implement than
the piecemeal orders of Brown to school districts. Although not present
in all areas that emit CO2, these simplified logistics will make an order
easier to issue and oversee in the Supreme Court.
V. THE SUPREME COURT MUST GRANT CERTIORARI TO JULIANA
The scientific evidence offered in Juliana demands immediate
action. Plaintiffs’ expert warns that climate change is irreversible since
“[a]tmospheric warming will continue for some [thirty] years after we
stop putting more greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. But that
warmed atmosphere will continue warming the ocean for centuries, and
the accumulating heat in the oceans will persist for millennia.”242 The
government’s scientists predict that current “sea levels will rise two feet
by 2050, nearly four feet by 2070, over eight feet by 2100, [eighteen]
feet by 2150, and over [thirty-one] feet by 2200.”243 Two million
American homes will become uninhabitable with a three-foot rise.
Miami, New Orleans, and other coastal cities will disappear with a
twenty-foot rise.244 Without action, the United States will change as we
know it. The government admitted in its Answer to the Juliana
complaint that it knew about the harmful effects of CO2 emissions.245
Yet, it continued not only to allow such emissions but to subsidize the
industries that create these emissions at a rapid pace.246
The undisputed scientific evidence that the plaintiffs present
mirror the studies brought in Brown that allowed the Court to overrule
Plessy. The science offered in Brown’s footnote eleven proved that the
See supra Section III.B.
Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1176 (Staton, J., dissenting); id. at 1171 (majority opinion);
see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
243 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1176 (Staton, J., dissenting).
244 Id. (Staton, J., dissenting).
245 See supra Section III.B.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 173–176.
241
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government’s policy of “separate but equal” had detrimental
psychological effects on black school children. But public school is not
the only place where segregation took place. There was no Civil Rights
Act. Integrating public schools would not force the public to shed its
conscious and unconscious biases, which continue to plague society
today.
The Supreme Court, however, was presented with a limited
question in Brown: Does segregation deprive black children of equal
educational opportunities?247 The Court answered yes, holding that
“[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”248 Integrated
schools would not stop the negative effects of segregation present in
other areas of the plaintiffs’ lives. But the Supreme Court did not use
these other instances of segregation as an excuse to maintain segregated
schools. Rather, the Court rightfully exercised its judicial power to fix
this injustice.
The Ninth Circuit faced a similar problem in Juliana. The hard
science presented by the plaintiffs indisputably proves that government
subsidies on fossil fuels have direct negative effects on the health and
well-being of all U.S. citizens. Fossil fuels will continue to burn and
disperse their harmful effects on Americans regardless of judicial action.
The court, however, was presented with a limited request: an order for
the government to develop a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emissions and
draw down excess atmospheric CO2.”249 In conflict with Brown, the
Ninth Circuit has told Americans that the judiciary cannot take steps
towards creating a safer environment because those steps would not be
perfect.250 Preventing fossil fuel subsidies will not altogether stop
extreme weather events, just like integrating schools would not
altogether stop racial discrimination in 1954. But even though climate
change has altered the environment in many irreversible ways, this is
no reason to continue to allow the government to promote the further
degradation of the Earth through fossil fuel subsidies.
The case presented to the Ninth Circuit in Juliana gave the Court all
the scientific evidence necessary to rule in favor of the plaintiffs. The
Ninth Circuit has rejected the plaintiffs petition for a rehearing en banc
to review the court’s sharply divided opinion.251

Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 495.
249 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2020).
250 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
251 Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 3688, at *5 (9th Cir.
Feb. 10, 2021).
247
248
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The Supreme Court should grant certiorari because this case has
national significance.252 According to plaintiffs’ experts, approximately
80 percent of the energy in the United States comes from fossil fuels
because of “political preference and historic government support”
rather than necessity.253 As the mix of renewable sources of energy
generation would necessarily accelerate as the result of a favorable
ruling, Juliana would become of tremendous national significance. If the
government received an order to lower the use of fossil fuels in the
United States, the country’s energy system would require
reconfiguration.
The Supreme Court may alternatively grant certiorari when a case
may have precedential value.254 Juliana would undoubtedly have
precedential value, as it would allow the Court to settle the
redressability question within substantive climate cases in the federal
government.255
Environmental cases often encounter problems
regarding standing, and the Court does not often have the opportunity
to address this question of substantive importance.
Finally, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to Juliana
because it will correct the injustice of forcing U.S. citizens to suffer the
negative effects of climate change. While the Court does “not grant cert
to correct individual injustices,”256 Juliana does not present an
individual injustice, but rather an injustice to all U.S. citizens. In that
way, Juliana closely mimics the injustice fought in Brown, which likewise
affected all citizens.

252 Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited Oct. 9, 2021).
253 Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1093 (noting evidence from Dr.
Joseph Stiglitz and Dr. Mark Jacobson).
254 Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 252.
255 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2020) (distinguishing
Juliana from Massachusetts v. EPA because the Juliana plaintiffs assert a substantive
right, while Massachusetts v. EPA involved merely a procedural right); see also
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (deciding the two issues of “whether
EPA has the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles; and if so, whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so are consistent with
the statute”).
256 Stewart A. Baker, A Practical Guide to Certiorari, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 611, 616
(1984).
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VI. CONCLUSION
“If we abdicate responsibility to address the difficult questions of
our time, those in need of refuge from the torrents of political, economic,
and religious forces will find no haven in the law and the law will no
longer be supreme.”257 The Juliana court ruled incorrectly because it
had the science available to support a groundbreaking decision, much
like Brown, but refused to grant the plaintiffs this “haven in the law.”258
The Court should grant certiorari to the Juliana impact litigation case
and proscribe the proper weight to the scientific evidence presented.
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Brown undoubtedly changed
society in the United States for the better, despite the slow, arduous
process that the law demanded. While overturning Juliana may require
another long, arduous process, it will undoubtedly leave the United
States in a better position, just as Brown did.

257 JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND
THE SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 278 (1993).
258

Id.

